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IAC-D-100	Validity Studies of National Estimates Validity Study of NIE 71-54: Probable Developments in North Africa, published 31 August 1954 (8 Dec 1955)
IAC-D-100/1	Validity Study of NIE 70: Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security, published 12 December 1952 (8 Dec 1955)
IAC-D-100/2	Validity Study of NIE 64-55: Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo, published 24 May 1955 (10 Jan 1956)
IAC-D-100/3	Validity Study of NIE 12-54: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956, published 24 August 1955 (10 Jan 1956)
IAC-D-100/4	Validity Study of NIE 24-54: Probable Developments in Italy, published 16 November 1954 (7 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-100/5	Validity Study of SE-48: Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea, published 13 October 1953 (7 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-100/6	Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet Policy with Respect to Berlin: NIE 81, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany Through Mid-1954, 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agreements," 1 Mar 1955; NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960," 17 May 1955; and NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," 6 Dec 1955 (28 Feb 1956)

ARMY, DOS and USAF review(s)  
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- IAC-D-100/7      Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55: Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through 1 July 1958, published 23 June 1955 (20 Mar 1956)
- IAC-D-100/8      Validity Studies of NIE 76, Probable Developments in Egypt, and of the Egyptian section of NIE 36-54, Probable Developments in the Arab States, in the light of NIE 36.1-55, published 15 November 1955 (20 Mar 1956)
- IAC-D-100/9      Validity Study of NIE 74: Probable Developments in Burma Through 1943, published 20 Feb 1953 (10 Apr 1956)
- IAC-D-100/10      Validity Studies of NIE 23-54: Probable Developments in West Germany, published 20 Dec 1954; and NIE 23-55: West Germany and the Reunification Issue, published 28 June 1955 (17 Apr 1956)
- IAC-D-100/11      Validity Study of NIE 79: Probable Developments in South Asia, published 30 June 1953 (9 May 1956)
- IAC-D-100/12      Validity Study of NIE 100-4-56: Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan (24 May 1956)
- IAC-D-100/13      Validity Study of NIE 27.1-54: Probable Developments in Spain, published 17 May 1954 (published 17 May 1954) - (13 June 1956)
- IAC-D-100/14      Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54: Probable Developments in North Africa, published 31 August 1954 (25 June 1956)

IAC-D-100/15	Validity Study of NIE 32-55: The Outlook for Greece, published 18 January 1955 (27 June 1956)
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IAC-D-100/17	Validity Study of NIE 63.1-55: Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and NIE 63.1-3-55: Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956, published 11 October 1955 (20 July 1956)
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IAC-D-100/19	Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55: Yugoslavia's International Position, published 7 Sept 1955 (27 July 1956)
IAC-D-100/20	Validity Study of NIE 65-55: Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955, published 1 March 1955 (9 August 1956)
IAC-D-100/21	Validity Study of NIE-83: Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa, published 30 December 1953 (16 August 1956)
IAC-D-100/22	Validity Study of NIE 71-55: Probable Developments in French North Africa (insofar as it relates to Algeria), published 29 Nov 1955 (10 Sept 1956)
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IAC-D-100/24	Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55: Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, published 17 May 1955 (20 Sept 1956)
IAC-D-100/25	Validity Study of NIE 43-55: The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government, published 1 Nov 1955 (10 Oct 1956)
IAC-D-100/26	Validity Study of NIE 52-55: Probable Developments in Pakistan, published 15 Mar 1955 (15 Nov 1956)
IAC-D-100/27	Validity Study of NIE 93-55: Probable Developments in Brazil, published 15 Mar 1955 (11 Jan 1957)
IAC-D-100/28	Validity Study of NIE 34-54: Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955, published 7 December 1954 (24 Jan 1957)
IAC-D-100/29	Validity Study of NIE 71-55: Probable Developments in French North Africa (insofar as it pertained to Morocco), published 29 November 1955 (1 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-100/30	Validity Study of NIE 66-54: Probable Developments in the Philippine Republic, published 23 Mar 1954 (15 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-100/31	Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56: Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations, published 27 Nov 1956 (21 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-100/32	Validity Study of NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, published 5 Oct 1954, and its Supplement, NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs, published 20 Dec 1955 (21 Mar 1957)
IAC-D-100/33	Validity Study of NIE 13-56: Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960, published 5 Jan 1956 (21 Mar 1957)

IAC-D-100/34	Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56: Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in Under-developed Areas, published 24 April 1956 (1 Apr 1957)
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IAC-D-100/36	Validity Study of NIE 36.5-56: The Outlook for US Interests in Libya, published 19 June 1956 (9 May 1957)
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IAC-D-100/38	Validity Study of NIE 36.2-56: The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies, published 17 July 1956 (7 June 1957)
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IAC-D-100/42	Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55: Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960, published 12 July 1955 (22 July 1957)
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IAC-D-100/45	Validity Study of NIE 71.2-56: Outlook for Algeria, published 5 September 1956 (16 Aug 1957)

IAC-D-100/46	Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55: Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World, 14 June 1955 (26 Aug 57)
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IAC-D-100/48	Validity Study of NIE 65-56: Probable Developments in Indonesia, published 7 August 1956 (13 Sept 1957)
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IAC-D-100/50	Validity Study of SNIE 36.7-56: Outlook for the Syrian Situation, published 16 November 1956 (16 Sept 1957)
IAC-D-100/51	Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56, "Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," published 19 February 1957 (5 Nov 1957)
IAC-D-100/52	Validity Study of NIE 36.1-55: The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy, published 15 November 1955 (12 Nov 1957)
IAC-D-100/53	Validity Study of NIE 31-57: Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects, published 11 June 1957 (26 Nov 1957)
IAC-D-100/54	Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in NIE 11-5-57: Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, published 12 March 1957 (26 Dec 1957)

IAC-D-100/55	Validity Study of NIE 92-56: The Outlook for Bolivia, published 11 September 1956 (7 Jan 1958)
IAC-D-100/56	Validity Study of NIE 64-56: The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960, published 24 January 1956 (15 Jan 1958)
IAC-D-100/57	Validity Studies of SNIE 42.1/2-56 and NIE 42.1-56, published 30 October 1956 and 7 February 1956, respectively (30 Jan 1958)
IAC-D-100/58	Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56: Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961, published 2 August 1956 (30 Jan 1958)
IAC-D-100/59	Validity Study of NIE 12-57: Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure, published 19 February 1957 (11 Feb 1958)
IAC-D-100/60	Validity Study of NIE 10-56: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, published 12 April 1955 (7 Mar 1958)
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IAC-D-100/63	Validity Study of NIE 27.1-56: Probable Developments in Spain, published 12 June 1956 (21 May 1958)
IAC-D-100/64	Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for Argentina, published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57, The Outlook for Argentina, published 12 November 1957 (6 Aug 1958)

IAC-D-100/65	Validity Study of NIE 100-57: Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas, published 26 March 1957 (6 Aug 1958)
IAC-D-100/66	Validity Study of NIE 62-57: Probable Developments in Thailand, published 18 June 1957 (10 Sept 1958)
IAC-D-100/67	Validity Study of NIE 34-57: The Outlook for Iran, published 23 Jan 1957 (10 Sept 1958)
IAC-D-100/68	Validity Study of NIE 51-57: Consequences of Economic Crisis in India, published 8 Oct 1957 (10 Sept 1958)



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IAC-D-100/68  
10 September 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 51-57:

Consequences of Economic Crisis in India,

published 8 October 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 51-57 was noted by the IAC  
on 2 September 1958 (IAC-M-359, item 9 c).



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IAC-D-100/67

10 September 1958

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

Validity Study of NIE 34-57:

The Outlook for Iran,

published 23 January 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 34-57 was noted by the IAC  
on 2 September 1958 (IAC-M-359, item 8 b).



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IAC-D-199/67  
10 September 1958

Validity Study of NIE 34-57:

The Outlook for Iran,

published 23 January 1957

NIE 34-57, "The Outlook for Iran," was written in January 1957 to cover developments in Iran "over the next few years." It was then estimated that the Shah's regime could remain in power for the next two years or so but that its ability to govern effectively beyond this time would depend greatly upon the success of plans for economic development and progress in social and political reforms. These estimates have proved to be valid, although today we perhaps have less faith in the political benefits of general economic development. In other respects as well the estimate has remained generally valid, although in need of updating as it nears the end of its period.

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IAC-D-100/66  
10 September 1958

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

Validity Study of NIE 62-57:

Probable Developments in Thailand,

published 18 June 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 62-57 was noted by the IAC  
on 19 August 1958 (IAC-M-357, item 7 c)



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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

IAC-D-100/66  
10 September 1958

Validity Study of NIE 62-57:

Probable Developments in Thailand,

published 18 June 1957

1. A virtually complete change in the top Thai leadership has taken place since publication of NIE 62-57. The estimate called attention to the intense rivalry between the Phao and Sarit factions. It stated that the chances of the 1947 coup group maintaining a working relationship were "about even" and that "the most likely outcome of a major change in leadership would be Sarit's ascendancy to dominant leadership."

2. Events to date have confirmed the basic estimate that the nature of Thai politics and Thai domestic and foreign policies would not change radically, at least in the short run, in the event of a shift in leadership.

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IAC-D-100/65

6 August 1958

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**


**Validity Study of NIE 100-57:**

**Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their**

**Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas,**

**published 26 March 1957**

The attached validity study of NIE 100-57 was noted by the  
IAC on 5 August 1958 (IAC-M-355, item 6).



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IAC-D-100/65  
6 August 1958

Validity Study of NIE 100-57:

Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their

Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas,

published 26 March 1957

1. NIE 100-57 correctly estimated that the rate at which the Bloc credits were extended would slow down. It also correctly estimated that the Bloc trade program would continue to expand.

2. However, we now believe that NIE 100-57 overestimated the extent to which competing internal demands would restrict expansion of the Bloc foreign economic program. Moreover, it did not foresee the number of opportunities which would develop in the Free World. In particular, it did not recognize the extent to which the underdeveloped countries would seize upon Bloc economic offers as a means of playing off the West against the East.

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IAC-D-100/64  
6 August 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for Argentina,  
published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57: The Outlook  
for Argentina, published 12 November 1957

The attached validity studies of NIE 91-56 and SNIE 91-57  
were noted by the IAC on 5 August 1958 (IAC-M-355, item 5).



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IAC-D-100/64  
6 August 1958

Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for Argentina,

published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57: The Outlook

for Argentina, published 12 November 1957

1. NIE 91-56 correctly assessed the character of the provisional government of General Aramburu and its intent to transfer power to an elected civilian government. Moreover, it pointed out that the Radical Party was the strongest contender in a national election, although it did not foresee the split in this party.

2. SNIE 91-57 re-estimated the prospects for a return to an elected government on schedule in May 1958 contained in NIE 91-56, and changed the estimate from "slightly better than even" to "even." In view of the orderly manner in which the elections were conducted and the President inaugurated, this estimate appears to have been over-cautious.

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IAC-D-100/63  
21 May 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 27.1-56:

Probable Developments in Spain,

published 12 June 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 27.1-56 was noted by the IAC  
on 20 May 1958 (IAC-M-342, item 7 c).



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IAC-D-100/63  
21 May 1958

Validity Study of NIE 27.1-56:

Probable Developments in Spain,

published 12 June 1956

NIE 27.1-56 has proved substantially correct. In some particulars it anticipated trends still developing at this moment, such as the continuing of labor unrest. It correctly calculated that Franco could retain power, and that oppositionist forces, although increasing in restlessness, would probably remain weak. Although calling attention to certain basic weaknesses in the Spanish industrial expansion program, the estimate failed to judge the severity of inflationary pressures that were developing and slightly underemphasized the rapidity with which foreign credits might be exhausted.

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IAC-D-100/62  
7 May 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 92:

Israel, 11 August 1953 and of Other Important Estimates  
on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956\*

The attached validity study of NIE 92 and of other important estimates on Israel in estimates prepared since April 1956 was noted by the IAC on 6 May 1958 (IAC-M-340, item 6).



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Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-100/62  
7 May 1958

Validity Study of NIE 92:

Israel, 11 August 1953 and of Other Important Estimates  
on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956\*

1. NIE 92 has held up well for the past five years; almost all its conclusions remain valid. However, it overestimated the deterrent effects of US influence in preventing an outbreak of major hostilities between Israel and the Arabs. It did not anticipate the USSR's active involvement in the area.

2. The NIE's involving Israel prepared during the past two years have generally stood up well, except in one significant respect. The SNIE's produced in the fall of 1956, particularly SNIE 30-3-56, SNIE 30-4-56, and SNIE 30-5-56, underestimated the likelihood of Israeli armed intervention in Egypt either alone or in conjunction with Anglo-French military action. While the focus at that time was principally upon British and French activities, a better measurement of Israeli interests and concerns as the Suez crisis developed might have permitted an accurate and earlier judgment regarding Israeli intentions in Sinai.

3. The estimates in NIE 30-2-57, NIE 36.1-57, and SNIE 30-58 in regard to the Arab-Israeli question remain valid.

\*The following estimates prepared during the past two years are applicable:

- SNIE 30-3-56, "Nasser and the Middle East Situation,"  
31 July 1956
- SNIE 30-4-56, "Probable Repercussions of British-French  
Military Action in the Suez Canal,"  
5 September 1956
- SNIE 30-5-56, "The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to  
Military Action Against Egypt in the Suez Canal,"  
19 September 1956
- NIE 30-2-57, "Near East Developments Affecting US Interests,"  
8 October 1957
- NIE 36.1-57, "The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime,"  
12 November 1957
- SNIE 30-58, "Prospects and Consequences of Arab Unity  
Moves," 20 February 1958

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IAC-D-100/61

1 May 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Studies of NIE 82-55, Probable Developments in  
Guatemala, published 26 July 1955, and NIE 80-57,  
Political Stability in Central America, published  
23 April 1957

The attached validity studies of NIE 82-55 and NIE 80-57  
were noted by the IAC on 29 April 1958 (IAC-M-339, item 5).



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Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-100/61

1 May 1958

Validity Studies of NIE 82-55, Probable Developments in  
Guatemala, published 26 July 1955, and NIE 80-57,  
Political Stability in Central America, published  
23 April 1957

NIE 82-55, and that portion of NIE 80-57 which treated of  
Guatemala, correctly estimated developments up to the unpre-  
dictable assassination of Castillo Armas.

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IAC-D-100/60  
7 March 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 10-55:

Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,  
published 12 April 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 10-55 was noted by the  
IAC on 4 March 1958 (IAC-M-331, item 9 c).



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IAC-D-100/59  
11 February 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 12-57:

Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,

published 19 February 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 12-57 was noted by the  
IAC on 4 February 1958 (IAC-M-327, item 6 c).



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**SECRET**IAC-D-100/59  
11 February 1958Validity Study of NIE 12-57:Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,published 19 February 1957

1. The main conclusions of NIE 12-57 still appear to be valid; for example, the estimates that Soviet policy would emphasize the security of the Satellite regimes and Soviet leadership, that the USSR was determined to remain in Eastern Europe, and that Poland's success in maintaining its semi-independence would be a key factor affecting future developments in the Satellites. However, to the limited extent that it is now possible to assess the validity of the projections made in this estimate, three of its judgments now appear to have been somewhat inaccurate.

2. NIE 12-57 underestimated the ability of the USSR and its Satellite regimes to restore order to the Satellite area relatively quickly and efficiently after the upheavals of October 1956. Thus, although stating that another revolt was unlikely, the estimate foresaw "greater strains" on Party unity within the Satellites than had existed prior to October 1956 and predicted that Soviet policy is "unlikely to reduce" tensions in Eastern Europe "or even to restore the degree of acquiescence prevailing earlier." We point out in NIE 12-58 that the USSR and its Satellite regimes have succeeded in effect in stabilizing the situation in the Satellites and reducing tensions, though we continue to anticipate "an atmosphere of change and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin."

3. The estimate also appears to have erred in suggesting that Soviet policy toward Poland would be directed toward undermining the Gomulka regime (in part through a rebuilding of the pro-Soviet faction in the Polish Party) and toward restoration of a "more reliable Communist regime." We now believe that the USSR has probably withdrawn its open support of the pro-Soviet faction and that the USSR's acceptance of the Gomulka regime appears to be a long-range adjustment rather than a temporary accommodation.

4. Finally, we appear to have overestimated the likely role of Communist China as a factor influencing the Soviets toward a more liberal policy in the Satellites.

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IAC-D-100/58  
30 January 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,

published 2 August 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961," published 2 August 1956, was noted by the IAC on 28 January 1958 (IAC-M-326, item b).



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IAC-D-100/58  
30 January 1958

Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,  
published 2 August 1956

1. Since this estimate covered a five-year period, it is premature to assess the validity of many of its judgments. Viewed in an eighteen-month perspective, however, the estimate's major judgments concerning Soviet capabilities and policies appear to have been sound. In particular, it correctly stressed even more than the preceding Soviet estimates the flexibility of the post-Stalin regime and the broad lines of Soviet external policy. On the other hand, some of its specific appraisals have had to be revised in producing NIE 11-4-57, and other possible developments were insufficiently emphasized or not anticipated.

2. Internal Political Developments. NIE 11-4-56 was properly skeptical of the stability of the top leadership. It did not anticipate that aspect of the power struggle which involved the Party's reassertion of its ascendancy over other elite groups, but it did point to continuing factional divisions, personal intrigues, and policy disputes. The conclusion that any struggle for power would be resolved without violence or a weakening of regime control also appears validated by the outcome of the 1957 purges.

3. Most of the judgments concerning other internal political matters still appear to be sound. The estimate did not stress, however, the growth of critical thinking and disaffection among Soviet students and the intelligentsia, which more recent evidence indicates has been taking place.

4. Economic Developments. Primarily because the targets of the Sixth Five-Year Plan were generally regarded as feasible, NIE 11-4-56 revised upward the rate of economic growth foreseen in its predecessor, NIE 11-3-55. In the light of the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and the relatively modest goals set for 1957 and 1958 this upward revision appears to have been too high, as was also the projection of industrial growth. NIE 11-4-56 also failed to predict that a somewhat higher priority would be given to consumption programs.

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30 January 1958

5. Bloc Developments. The estimate clearly erred in predicting that the transition to a new post-Stalin policy in Eastern Europe could be completed "without serious disruption." This mistake arose primarily from a failure to appreciate the growth and significance of disunity and conflicting loyalties within the Polish and Hungarian Communist parties. The aims of post-Stalin Satellite policy, however, were correctly appreciated, as was Communist willingness to abandon liberalization if it produced a fundamental challenge to the Communist regimes. While the basic unifying factors in the Sino-Soviet alliance were properly appraised, little attention was paid to the increasing stature of Communist China within the Bloc; on this point NIE 11-3-55 was a more useful estimate.

6. Foreign Policy. The judgment that "peaceful coexistence" would continue to characterize the Soviet approach to foreign affairs appears to have been a valid one. The estimate correctly described the use of the peace and anti-colonialism campaigns and of traditional methods of diplomacy, and Soviet stress on the underdeveloped and uncommitted areas. Its judgments of the Soviet position on Germany and disarmament have been borne out. NIE 11-4-56 did not, however, fully anticipate Soviet concentration upon the Middle East in 1957, and too great a weight may have been given to Soviet respect for the vital nature of Western interests in that area. Finally, NIE 11-4-56 did not foresee the extent to which Soviet technological achievements would bolster Soviet self-confidence and perhaps lead to more venturesome policies.

7. Military and Scientific. The validity of many of the estimates made in the military chapters of NIE 11-4-56 cannot be adequately tested at this time. The broad picture of Soviet military strengths and capabilities presented in NIE 11-4-56 appears to have been generally valid. However, on the basis of evidence accumulated over the intervening months, several important projections appear to have been in error: (a) NIE 11-4-56 projected a more rapid Soviet buildup in heavy bombers than we now believe has actually occurred, and somewhat underestimated the number of jet medium bombers the USSR would add to its forces; (b) the

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IAC-D-100/58  
30 January 1958

estimate predicted a much higher rate of long-range, conventional submarine construction for 1957 and after than actually occurred; (c) subsequent evidence indicates that the performance characteristics of certain Soviet long-range bomber types were somewhat overestimated; and (d) new evidence leads to the conclusion that the USSR is probably developing an IRBM of somewhat shorter range than estimated in NIE 11-4-56, and that it as well as the first Soviet operational ICBM probably will be available earlier than previously estimated. So far as concerns manpower strengths, we now tend to believe that the bulk of the reductions from Korean War peaks probably largely preceded rather than followed the announcements of 1955 and 1956. In any event, we believe that Soviet military manpower strengths have over the past decade varied considerably more than indicated in previous estimates.

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IAC-D-100/57  
30 January 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Studies of SNIE 42.1/2-56 and NIE 42.1-56

The attached validity studies of SNIE 42.1/2-56, "Probable Political Developments in the Republic of Korea Through 1957," published 30 October 1956, and NIE 42.1-56, "Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea Through Mid-1957," published 7 February 1956, were noted by the IAC on 28 January 1958 (IAC-M-326, item 5 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/57  
30 January 1958

Validity Studies of SNIE 42.1/2-56: Probable Political Developments in the Republic of Korea Through 1957, published 30 October 1956; and NIE 42.1-56: Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea Through Mid-1957, published 7 February 1956

1. The major judgments of the two outstanding previous estimates on the Republic of Korea were sound.
2. SNIE 42.1/2-56, Probable Political Developments in the Republic of Korea Through 1957 (30 October 1956), was based largely on a number of contingencies which have not yet materialized, including the prolonged illness or death of Rhee, the subsequent political problems, and major reductions in US aid. However, we believe that the estimate continues to be valid.
3. NIE 42.1-56, Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea Through Mid-1957 (7 February 1956), was valid in nearly all respects. It miscalculated the outcome of the Vice Presidential election which followed by three months the publication of the estimate. It asserted: "Whatever candidate [Rhee] eventually favors for Vice President will almost certainly win." However, Rhee's favored candidate, Yi Ki-pong, was defeated by Chang Myon, who was in Rhee's disfavor.
4. NIE 42.1-56 was also inaccurate with regard to an important sector of the economy. It stated: "If weather conditions continue favorable, the ROK could have about 100,000 metric tons of rice annually available for export in 1956 and 1957, with a potential foreign exchange value of as much as \$17 million." The 1957 crop was excellent, but none will be exported due to increasing domestic consumption. In fact, the ROK is expected to be a heavy importer of grain during the 1957-58 crop year.

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IAC-D-100/56  
15 January 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 64-56:

The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,  
published 24 January 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 64-56, "The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960," published 24 January 1956, was noted by the IAC on 14 January 1958 (IAC-M-324).



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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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IAC-D-100/55  
7 January 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 92-56:

The Outlook for Bolivia,

published 11 September 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 92-56, "The Outlook for Bolivia, " published 11 September 1956, was noted by the IAC on 7 January 1958 (IAC-M-323, item 8 c).



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IAC-D-100/55  
7 January 1958

Validity Study of NIE 92-56:

The Outlook for Bolivia,

published 11 September 1956

1. The previous estimate (NIE 92-56) correctly forecast the general situation in Bolivia during 1956-1957, pointing toward a continuation of the MNR regime in power with some economic progress.

2. The estimate anticipated the latent threat to internal stability represented by labor-leftist leader Juan Lechin. However, it underestimated Siles' capabilities for obtaining the popular support which enabled him to counteract the threat to his position and program posed by Lechin in mid-July 1957.

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IAC-D-100/53  
26 November 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 31-57:

Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,

published 11 June 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 31-57, "Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects," published 11 June 1957, was noted by the IAC on 19 November 1957 (IAC-M-316, item 4 d).



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IAC-D-100/53  
26 November 1957

Validity Study of NIE 31-57:

Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,

published 11 June 1957 \*

1. Some of the conclusions in NIE 31-57 now appear to have been at least partly in error. The estimate was published just prior to the ouster of Tito's enemy in the Kremlin, Molotov, and was written for the most part during the period of strained Soviet-Yugoslav relations which followed the Hungarian revolt; many basic Yugoslav attitudes concerning the USSR were submerged during that period. Moreover, at the time of NIE 31-57's publication, intelligence concerning Yugoslav foreign policies was scantier than at present; and the implications of the October events in Eastern Europe and the resultant Soviet-Yugoslav polemics loomed larger in June 1957 than they do at present. At any rate, the rapid improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the summer and fall of 1957 was not foreseen in the June estimate.

2. In general, the estimate revealed a tendency to under-rate the basic Yugoslav desire for rapprochement with Bloc countries; it did not fully assess the long-run impact of the Hungarian revolt on the Yugoslav attitude toward Eastern Europe (resulting in Belgrade's desire for slow change and stability in the area); and it reflected a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav estimate of Soviet and Western intentions.

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\* This validity study is restricted to those portions of NIE 31-57 which dealt with Yugoslavia's external affairs. A validity study of the estimate's conclusions concerning internal affairs will follow the next general estimate on Yugoslavia.

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IAC-D-100/53  
26 November 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 31-57:

Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,

published 11 June 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 31-57, "Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects," published 11 June 1957, was noted by the IAC on 19 November 1957 (IAC-M-316, item 4 d).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/53  
26 November 1957

Validity Study of NIE 31-57:

Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,

published 11 June 1957 \*

1. Some of the conclusions in NIE 31-57 now appear to have been at least partly in error. The estimate was published just prior to the ouster of Tito's enemy in the Kremlin, Molotov, and was written for the most part during the period of strained Soviet-Yugoslav relations which followed the Hungarian revolt; many basic Yugoslav attitudes concerning the USSR were submerged during that period. Moreover, at the time of NIE 31-57's publication, intelligence concerning Yugoslav foreign policies was scantier than at present; and the implications of the October events in Eastern Europe and the resultant Soviet-Yugoslav polemics loomed larger in June 1957 than they do at present. At any rate, the rapid improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the summer and fall of 1957 was not foreseen in the June estimate.

2. In general, the estimate revealed a tendency to under-rate the basic Yugoslav desire for rapprochement with Bloc countries; it did not fully assess the long-run impact of the Hungarian revolt on the Yugoslav attitude toward Eastern Europe (resulting in Belgrade's desire for slow change and stability in the area); and it reflected a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav estimate of Soviet and Western intentions.

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\* This validity study is restricted to those portions of NIE 31-57 which dealt with Yugoslavia's external affairs. A validity study of the estimate's conclusions concerning internal affairs will follow the next general estimate on Yugoslavia.

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IAC-D-100/52  
12 November 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 36.1-55:

The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy,  
published 15 November 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 36.1-55, "The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy," published 15 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 12 November 1957 (IAC-M-315, item 5 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/52  
12 November 1957

Validity Study of NIE 36.1-55:

The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy,

published 15 November 1955

The estimates contained in NIE 36.1-55 have held up well in view of the many dramatic events that have occurred since the paper was published. The estimate failed to anticipate the vigor and determination with which the Soviets have pressed their campaign to develop their position in Egypt. It did not discuss the possibility of nationalization of the Suez Canal.

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IAC-D-100/51  
5 November 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56, "Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," published 19 February 1957

The attached validity study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56, "Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," published 19 February 1957, was noted by the IAC on 5 November 1957 (IAC-M-314, item 6 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/51  
5 November 1957

Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56, "Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," published 19 February 1957.

1. The projection of main trends in NIE 23-56 has stood up well. The paper was too conservative on Adenauer's chances to obtain a majority in the recent elections, and overestimated the attraction to West Germans of parties advocating a more independent course in foreign relations. This estimate was influenced by the greater appeal which Soviet policy was exercising in West Germany during the period after Geneva and prior to the outbreaks in Poland and Hungary.

2. The estimate on Berlin, NIE 11-3-56, has proven to be generally correct. NIE 12-57, insofar as East Germany is treated (para. 22), has also proven to be sound.

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IAC-D-100/50  
16 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of SNIE 36.7-56:

Outlook for the Syrian Situation,

published 16 November 1956

The attached validity study of SNIE 36.7-56, "Outlook for the Syrian Situation," published 16 November 1956, was noted by the IAC on 10 September 1957 (IAC-M-306, item 8).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/50  
16 September 1957

Validity Study of SNIE 36.7-56:

Outlook for the Syrian Situation,

published 16 November 1956

SNIE 36.7-56 was produced during the Suez crisis last fall as a short-term paper. The estimate proved to be accurate in all major respects and most of its judgments are still valid today. Its assessment of the internal situation in Syria (Paras. 3-5) and of Soviet policy toward Syria (Paras. 6-10) has been confirmed by subsequent developments.

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IAC-D-100/49  
13 September 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 43-56:

The Prospects of the Government of the

Republic of China,

published 9 October 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China," published 9 October 1956, was noted by the IAC on 27 August 1957 (IAC-M-304, item 6 c).



Secretary

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IAC -D-100/49  
13 September 1957

Validity Study of NIE 43-56:

The Prospects of the Government of the

Republic of China,

published 9 October 1956

1. The conclusions of NIE 43-56, dated 9 October 1956, have been generally borne out by events. However, the short-term estimate of a decline in the Republic of China's morale and international fortunes was somewhat overstated. Subsequent Soviet actions in Hungary as well as Chinese Communist domestic difficulties have aided the National Government in maintaining both its morale and its formal international position.

2. Although a growth in anti-American sentiment was indicated, the possibility of anti-American riots was not explicitly discussed.

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IAC-D-100/48  
13 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 65-56:

Probable Developments in Indonesia,

published 7 August 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 65-56, "Probable Developments in Indonesia," published 7 August 1956, was noted by the IAC on 27 August 1957 (IAC-M-304, item 5 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/48  
13 September 1957

Validity Study of NIE 65-56:

Probable Developments in Indonesia,

published 7 August 1956

1. NIE 65-56 failed to anticipate several important developments of the past year and underrated the chances of others. While we did foresee continuing instability and unresolved problems, we estimated that there would be slow economic progress and moderately favorable prospects for slow advance toward a modern democratic state. In fact, Indonesia has undergone a series of adverse developments during the past year.

2. The estimate underplayed the force of regionalism and did not anticipate recent moves toward provincial autonomy. Although it pointed out the army's lack of cohesion and lack of responsiveness to civilian authority, it did not warn that these regional movements would be led by army elements.

3. NIE 65-56 estimates that "the Ali government will probably remain in office for at least the next year." The Ali government remained in office considerably less than a year, and during at least the last three months of its tenure it was largely ineffective. The estimate did not anticipate Sukarno's attempt to reorganize the Indonesian political system.

4. The analysis of PKI prospects and strategy has proven generally valid, although it did not anticipate the sequence of events which have enabled the PKI to increase considerably its influence and strength by posing as the supporter and champion of Sukarno's plans and programs.

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IAC-D-100/47  
12 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 63.3/1-55:

Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956,

published 20 December 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 63.3/1-55, "Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956," published 20 December 1955, was noted by the IAC on 20 August 1957 (IAC-M-303, item 10 d).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/47  
12 September 1957

Validity Study of NIE 63.3/1-55:

Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956,

published 20 December 1955

Although NIE 63.3/1-55 correctly estimated that neither side was likely to initiate large-scale hostilities, it incorrectly predicted a gradual buildup in the scale and intensity of hostilities in northern Laos through the first half of 1955. Moreover it estimated that there was little likelihood of an effective cease-fire. In these latter respects it failed to foresee the investiture of Souvanna Phouma in the spring of 1956 and his soft line toward the Pathet Lao which resulted in a cease-fire in August and subsequent emphasis on political negotiations.

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IAC-D-100/46  
26 August 1957


**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55:

Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for  
the Communist Bloc and the Free World

published 14 June 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 100-5-55, "Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World," published 14 June 1955, was noted by the IAC on 20 August 1957 (IAC-M-303, item 6).



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

IAC-D-100/46  
26 August 1957

Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55:

Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for  
the Communist Bloc and the Free World

published 14 June 1955

1. This estimate dealt in general terms with the effects of increasing nuclear capabilities on public attitudes and national policies in the Communist and non-Communist world. Many of its judgments involved long-term attitudinal trends which cannot yet be measured or checked with any preciseness and with contingent situations that have not yet arisen. In general we believe that its conclusions remain sound and the succeeding estimate, NIE 100-4-57 reaches many similar judgments, although with somewhat differing emphasis as to the most important effects of the nuclear situation.

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3



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IAC-D-100/45  
16 August 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 71.2-56:

Outlook for Algeria,

published 5 September 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 71.2-56, "Outlook for  
Algeria," published 5 September 1956, was noted by the IAC  
on 13 August 1957 (IAC-M-302, item 4 c).

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IAC-D-100/45  
16 August 1957

Validity Study of NIE 71.2-56:

Outlook for Algeria,

published 5 September 1956

NIE 71.2-56 has proved incorrect in its most important estimate: that there was a somewhat better than even chance for an Algerian settlement within a 12-month period. The main causes of that miscalculation were: (a) an overestimate of France's willingness to face the realities of the Algerian situation, (b) a failure to estimate the Mollet government's adoption of an increasingly rightist policy toward Algeria, and (c) the unforeseen armed intervention at Suez and the subsequent intensely nationalistic French reaction. On the other hand, the NIE did state that the Suez controversy would delay a settlement; it correctly estimated a widened and intensified conflict if a settlement were not achieved; and it was generally accurate in predicting the position and policies of the Algerian nationalists.

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IAC-D-100/44  
16 August 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 22-56:

The Outlook for France,

published 10 July 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 22-56, "The Outlook for France," published 10 July 1956, was noted by the IAC on 13 August 1957 (IAC-M-302, item 4 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/44  
16 August 1957

Validity Study of NIE 22-56:

The Outlook for France,

published 10 July 1956

The conclusions of NIE 22-56 for the most part remain valid; some were projected over the longer run and their validity has not been fully tested. Warnings were given regarding future economic difficulties, but the present financial problem developed in a manner which was not specifically foreseen. The NIE correctly stated that an Algerian settlement was unlikely in the near future, and that the French pacification effort could be continued for some time; the longer-range prediction of a trend toward a settlement "during the next several years" still appears valid.

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IAC-D-100/42  
22 July 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55:

Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960,

published 12 July 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 11-5-55, "Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960," published 12 July 1955, was noted by the IAC on 16 July 1957 (IAC-M-298, item 7 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/42  
22 July 1957

Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55:

Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960

published 12 July 1955

We have examined the future projections set forth in NIE 11-5-55, and find them to have been generally valid. Evidence accumulated over the two-year period since completion of the estimate indicates that, as predicted, Soviet air defense programs have in fact emphasized the development and production of air defense guided missiles, improved fighter aircraft, and improved radar equipment. While more than half the period covered by NIE 11-5-55 is still in the future and therefore cannot be assessed as to validity, our present estimate of Bloc air defense trends over the next several years remains in close agreement with that made in 1955.

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IAC-D-100/41  
25 June 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 62-54:

Probable Developments in Thailand,

published 7 December 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 62-54, "Probable Developments in Thailand," published 7 December 1954, was noted by the IAC on 18 June 1957 (IAC-M-294, item 6 b).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/41  
25 June 1957

Validity Study of NIE 62-54:

Probable Developments in Thailand,

published 7 December 1954

1. NIE 62-54 has proven to be a generally sound estimate. Several internal developments were not foreseen in detail, including the introduction of the "democratization" program in September 1955 and its effects on the 1957 elections, the downgrading of Phao's strength in 1955 and 1957 and the ascendancy of Sarit.

2. The estimate foresaw the possibility of a Thai reassessment of their foreign policy, although the developments which appear to be bringing it about are somewhat different from the contingencies discussed.

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IAC-D-100/40  
25 June 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,  
(insofar as it pertained to Tunisia)

published 29 November 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Developments in French North Africa" (insofar as it pertained to Tunisia), published 29 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 18 June 1957 (IAC-M-294, item 4 b).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/40  
25 June 1957

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,  
(insofar as it pertained to Tunisia)

published 29 November 1955

NIE 71-55 (published 29 November 1955) correctly evaluated the strength of Tunisian nationalist pressures for independence, and predicted the impact which French concessions in Morocco would have in Tunisia. However, it failed to estimate accurately the rapidity with which Tunisia would achieve its independence, largely because of the swift change in French policy.

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IAC-D-100/39  
13 June 1957


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 31-56:

Yugoslavia's International Position,

published 24 July 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 31-56, "Yugoslavia's International Position," published 24 July 1956, was noted by the IAC on 11 June 1956 (IAC-M-293, item 3 c).



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

IAC-D-100/39  
13 June 1957

Validity Study of NIE 31-56:

Yugoslavia's International Position,

published 24 July 1956

Though many of the details in the discussion in the last estimate on Yugoslavia (NIE 31-56, dated 24 July 1956) have been outmoded by the events in Poland and Hungary and by the subsequent change in Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia, the general conclusions and descriptions of Yugoslav policies and motivations contained therein remain valid.

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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IAC-D-100/38  
7 June 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 36.2-56:

The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,

published 17 July 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 36.2-56, "The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies," published 17 July 1956, was noted by the IAC on 4 June 1957 (IAC-M-292, item 5 c).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/38  
7 June 1957

Validity Study of NIE 36.2-56:

The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,

published 17 July 1956

Although it has been found desirable to reassess the outlook for Iraq in the light of the Suez crisis and other recent developments in the Middle East, that review has confirmed the analysis contained in NIE 36.2-56 in virtually all major respects.

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IAC-D-100/37  
17 May 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 63-56:

Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam

Through Mid-1957,

published 17 July 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 63-56, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam, published 17 July 1956, was noted by the IAC on 14 May 1957 (IAC-M-289, item 6 c).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/37  
17 May 1957

Validity Study of NIE 63-56:

Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam

Through Mid-1957,

published 17 July 1956

The conclusions of NIE 63-56, dated 17 July 1956, have been generally borne out by events with the following exceptions:

a. The progress in establishing an adequate administrative and control apparatus was overstated. Subsequent DRV criticism has indicated that at the time the land reform program was initiated the party structure in many of the rural areas was weak and that many party members at the time were nationalists rather than hard-core Communists.

b. The degree of opposition and passive resistance was understated and no allowance was made for the eruption of open resistance within North Vietnam. The conclusion that the regime would remain in firm control has proven to be correct.

c. Economic progress in 1956 was greater than estimated, particularly in rice production.

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IAC-D-100/36  
9 May 1957


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 36.5-56:

The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,

published 19 June 1956

The attached validity of NIE 36.5-56, "The Outlook for US Interests in Libya," published 19 June 1956, was noted by the IAC on 7 May 1957 (IAC-M-288, item 7 b).



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IAC-D-100/36  
9 May 1957

Validity Study of NIE 36.5-56:

The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,

published 19 June 1956

NIE 36.5-56 has generally held up well and remains useful as a basic estimative analysis of Libya and US interests therein. However, it has to some extent been outdated by the recent British decision to make drastic reductions in its military and financial commitments in Libya and other base areas and by the repercussions of the Suez crisis. It should therefore be used only in conjunction with SNIE 36.5-57, in which these and other later developments are taken into account.

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IAC-D-100/35  
26 April 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 80-54:

The Caribbean Republics,

published 24 August 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 80-54, "The Caribbean Republics," published 24 August 1954, was noted by the IAC on 23 April 1957 (IAC-M-286, item 5 c).



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IAC-D-100/35

26 April 1957

Validity Study of NIE 80-54:The Caribbean Republics,published 24 August 1954

1. NIE 80-54 raised the question as to whether existing regimes could bring themselves to promote sufficient social and economic progress to maintain a modicum of stability in the area or whether static repression would lead to an eventual violent explosion. Since 1954 developments have been along the line of the first alternative, although, as predicted, there has been no substantial improvement in basic conditions. The Communists in the area have tended to play the game more cautiously than prognosticated in NIE 80-54.

2. NIE 80-54 estimated that Somoza and Perez Jiminez were unlikely to become reconciled to the continued existence of the Figueres regime in Costa Rica, and identified this antagonism as the greatest present threat to stability and order in the region. It did not specifically predict the filibustering attack on Costa Rica early in 1955, with their covert support, or Perez Jiminez' subsequent withdrawal from Central American affairs. Neither did it predict the improvement in Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations subsequent to the assassination of President Somoza of Nicaragua. NIE 80-54 pointed up the instability in Honduras which eventually led to the fall of the government, but it did not anticipate the collapse of the Magloire regime in Haiti. The 1954 estimate did not foresee the transfer of the target of non-Communist subversive activity from the Central American region to Cuba. Perhaps one reason for this failure was the degree of confidence with which the political fortunes of Batista were viewed at that time.

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IAC-D-100/34  
1 April 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56:

Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in

Underdeveloped Areas,

published 24 April 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 100-3-56, "Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas," published 24 April 1956, was noted by the IAC on 26 March 1957 (IAC-M-282, item 8 b).



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IAC-D-100/34

1 April 1957

Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56:

Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in

Underdeveloped Areas,

published 24 April 1956

1. The general conclusions of the estimate appear to be valid. Bloc credits have expanded rapidly, though Bloc trade not related to its credit arrangements has increased more slowly than was implicitly assumed. The strengthening of non-Communist markets during 1956 has led to a substantially smaller economic dependence on the Bloc for Burma, and Bloc trade declined significantly with Argentina and Cuba.

2. The political effects of Bloc policy in the uncommitted states in the Middle East and Asia appear to have been accurately estimated. Some of them seem to have become more wary of the implications of close ties with the Bloc, in part because of events in Hungary. Nevertheless, the appeal of Bloc trade and aid remains strong in most of the area.

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IAC-D-100/33  
21 March 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 13-56:

Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable

Courses of Action Through 1960,

published 5 January 1956

The attached validity study of NIE 13-56, "Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960," published 5 January 1956, was noted by the IAC on 19 March 1957 (IAC-M-281, 19 March 1957, item 6 c).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/33  
21 March 1957

Validity Study of NIE 13-56:

Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable

Courses of Action Through 1960,

published 5 January 1956

1. NIE 13-56 was a study of Chinese Communist capabilities and probable courses of action from 1955 through 1960. As of the end of 1956 the general conclusions and estimates appear to be still valid.

2. NIE 13-56 did not anticipate the rapidity with which the regime would institute agrarian collectivization, or that such a sweeping undertaking could be accomplished without initial widespread peasant resistance or a serious fall in agricultural output. However, the new collectives have not been fully tested and despite its improving control mechanisms, potential peasant dissatisfaction remains a problem, particularly in case of poor harvests.

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

IAC-D-100/31

21 February 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56:

Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations,

published 27 November 1956

The attached validity study of SNIE 12-3-56, "Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations," published 27 November 1956, was noted by the IAC on 19 February 1957 (IAC-M-278, item 5 c).



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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

IAC-D-100/31  
21 February 1957

Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56:

Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations,

published 27 November 1956

Insufficient time has passed to permit an assessment of the validity of this estimate. Its main conclusions still remain valid, although it appears to have underestimated somewhat the probability of a Soviet return to a harder policy, which seems implicit to recent Soviet actions.

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Approved For Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3

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IAC-D-100/30  
15 February 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 66-54:

Probable Developments in the Philippine Republic,  
published 23 March 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 66-54, "Probable Developments in the Philippine Republic," published 23 March 1954, was noted by the IAC on 12 February 1957 (IAC-M-277, item 5 c).



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IAC-D-100/29  
1 February 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa  
(insofar as it pertained to Morocco),

published 29 November 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Developments in French North Africa," (insofar as it pertained to Morocco), published 29 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 29 January 1957 (IAC-M-276, item 8 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/29  
1 February 1957

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa  
(insofar as it pertained to Morocco),

published 29 November 1955

NIE 71-55 (published 29 November 1955) failed to estimate accurately the rapidity with which Morocco would achieve its independence. France was compelled to make concessions during the past year which NIE 71-55 had not anticipated. However, the NIE correctly predicted that serious difficulties would arise over definition of Morocco's independence within a "framework of interdependence."

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IAC-D-100/28  
24 January 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 34-54:

Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,

published 7 December 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 34-54, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955," published 7 December 1954, was noted by the IAC on 23 January 1957 (IAC-M-275, item 6 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/28  
24 January 1957

Validity Study of NIE 34-54:

Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,

published 7 December 1954

NIE 34-54 has held up well in most respects for a period considerably beyond its formal date of expiration; most of its main judgments still appear to remain basically sound. However, in stressing the continuing importance of popular discontent and restlessness, the estimate failed to anticipate the extent to which the Shah has thus far been successful in controlling such tendencies and strengthening his own control of the government. In particular, it did not anticipate that the Shah would solve the leadership problem by installing a puppet cabinet. Similarly, the estimate failed to anticipate that the Shah would adhere to the Baghdad Pact despite the lack of real popular support for such a move and despite US unwillingness to provide prior security and increased aid commitments which might be used to justify Iranian adherence.

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IAC-D-100/27  
11 January 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 93-55:

Probable Developments in Brazil,

published 15 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 93-55, "Probable Developments in Brazil," published 15 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 8 January 1957 (IAC-M-273, 8 January 1957, item 8 c).



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IAC-D-100/27  
11 January 1957

Validity Study of NIE 93-55:

Probable Developments in Brazil,

published 15 March 1955

1. NIE 93-55 correctly forecast the broad political and economic developments in the 1955-1956 period, i. e., that Kubitschek would be elected, that chronic political tension would continue, and that there was little chance that the new administration would be able to deal effectively with Brazil's deep-seated and politically dangerous economic difficulties.

2. The unanticipated military split resulting from Lott's November 1955 preventive coup led to an incorrect estimate of the attitude of the military toward the new administration. Instead of the armed forces united in opposition to the new administration, the latter has army support.

3. Partly as a result of army influence in the present regime and partly because of the US decision to provide substantial economic assistance to Brazil, a moderate political course, rather than further evolution to the left, as suggested in NIE 93-55, has thus far prevailed.

4. Documentation obtained during 1956 has revealed that NIE 93-55 greatly exaggerated the actual membership of the Communist Party in Brazil.

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IAC-D-100/26  
15 November 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 52-55:

Probable Developments in Pakistan,

published 15 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 52-55, "Probable Developments in Pakistan," published 15 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 13 November 1956 (IAC-M-266, 13 November 1956, item 9 c).



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Acting Secretary

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~~SECRET~~IAC-D-100/26  
15 November 1956Validity Study of NIE 52-55:Probable Developments in Pakistan,published 15 March 1955

This estimate has been borne out by events in most respects, and its basic analysis of the situation appears to remain valid. However, it has inevitably become outdated in some respects. With the disappearance from the political scene of Ghulam Mohammed, the character of the ruling group has changed somewhat, particularly in the emergence of Mirza as the dominant figure. The restoration of parliamentary government, the series of political maneuvers leading to Suhrawardy's elevation to the premiership, and the approach of general elections under the new constitution have added new dimensions to the struggle between the ruling group and its rivals. While Pakistan's economy remains precarious, its immediate situation and prospects have improved somewhat over the last year and a half, in part as a result of US action. In the foreign affairs field, the ending of the honeymoon period in US-Pakistani relations, the development of the Bloc campaign to woo the Arab-Asian nations, and the increasing articulateness of popular feeling on international questions have all made Pakistan likely to be somewhat more restrained in its pro-Westernism than was indicated in NIE 52-55.

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IAC-D-100/25  
10 October 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 43-55:

The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government,

published 1 November 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 43-55, "The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government," published 1 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 10 October 1956 (IAC-M-259, 9 October 1956, item 6 e).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/25  
10 October 1956

Validity Study of NIE 43-55:

The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government,

published 1 November 1955

The major estimates in NIE 43-55 either have proven to be correct or we continue to believe that they are valid. In particular, although the international position of the Nationalist Government has deterioriated as additional countries have recognized Communist China, the Nationalists have maintained domestic stability and they have succeeded in maintaining a rate of economic growth greater than the rate of population increase.

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IAC-D-100/24  
20 September 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses  
of Action Through 1960,  
published 17 May 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, published 17 May 1955, was noted by the IAC on 19 September 1956 (IAC-M-256, 19 September 1956, item 6 b).



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IAC-D-100/24  
20 September 1956

Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses  
of Action Through 1960,  
published 17 May 1955

Since the estimate covered a five-year period, many of its particular statements are not subject to a test of validity. The events of the intervening year and the work done on the successor paper, NIE 11-4-56, permit the conclusion that during its useful life this estimate was basically a sound guide for the most important judgments affecting Soviet capabilities and policy. Like the two previous Soviet estimates, NIE 11-3-55 failed to appreciate the range of the post-Stalin regime's flexibility in both internal and external policy. In addition, a number of specific estimates have had to be revised in producing NIE 11-4-56, and in other respects possible developments were insufficiently emphasized or not anticipated at all. The following more important defects are noted:

1. If current calculations are correct, NIE 11-3-55 underestimated the rate of Soviet economic growth over the period 1955-1960, and implied that military expenditures would constitute more of a problem for Soviet planners than is now believed to be the case. Changes in these estimates which were recorded in NIE 11-4-56 resulted from new data available on 1955 plan fulfillment, on the Sixth Five-Year Plan, and from the study of military costs done for the first time in connection with NIE 11-4-56.
2. NIE 11-3-55 failed to anticipate moves to reduce the size of Soviet military forces, although it apparently carried total military strength at too low a figure for 1955.
3. The rate of introduction of new heavy bomber types to mid-1956 was substantially overestimated, and the build-up in jet medium bombers may have been somewhat underestimated.

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IAC-D-100/24  
20 September 1956

4. The paper estimated that the Soviet reaction to the initiation of West German rearmament would be more forceful than has in fact proved to be the case, and attached too much weight to the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany in exchange for neutralization of a united Germany.

5. There was a failure to anticipate the scale and scope of the Soviet program of trade and aid for under-developed countries.

6. The estimate did not adequately anticipate the scale and nature of Soviet activities in the Middle East.

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IAC-D-100/23  
12 September 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 92-54:

Probable Developments in Bolivia,

published 19 March 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 92-54, "Probable Developments in Bolivia," published 19 March 1954, was noted by the IAC on 11 September 1956 (IAC-M-255, 11 September 1956, item 5c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/23  
12 September 1956

Validity Study of NIE 92-54:  
Probable Developments in Bolivia,  
published 19 March 1954

NIE 92-54 proved to be generally sound. It correctly forecast the course the MNR regime would follow during 1954-56, both domestically and in its external relations. Among minor deficiencies it proved a little too optimistic on economic progress, somewhat too pessimistic on the political stability of the MNR and unduly apprehensive over the adverse political consequences of continued inflation.

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IAC-D-100/22  
10 September 1956


I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,  
(insofar as it relates to Algeria)

published 29 November 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Developments in French North Africa," (insofar as it relates to Algeria), was noted by the IAC on 5 September 1956 (IAC-M-254, 5 September 1956, item 7 c).



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IAC-D-100/22  
10 September 1956

Validity Study of NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,  
(insofar as it relates to Algeria)

published 29 November 1955

The primary defect in NIE 71-55 as it pertained to Algeria was failure to anticipate the rapidity with which the Algerian nationalist drive toward independence would develop. This, in turn, was in large measure due to the unexpected French grant of "independence" to Morocco and Tunisia.

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IAC-D-100/21  
16 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE-83:

Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,

published 30 December 1953

The attached validity study of NIE-83, "Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa," published 30 December 1953, was noted by the IAC on 14 August 1956 (IAC-M-252, item 7 c).



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Secretary

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**SECRET**IAC-D-100/21  
16 August 1956Validity Study of NIE-83:Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,published 30 December 1953

1. We believe that developments in Tropical Africa have generally supported the estimates set forth in NIE-83, which was the first National Intelligence Estimate on the area. There was a tendency to underestimate the speed with which political consciousness would develop and nationalist movements would gain momentum in some territories. Thus, the predictions concerning the ability of the colonial powers to maintain control over their Tropical African dependencies, while correctly identifying the forces at work and valid for the period between NIE-83 and the present, now require some restatement and modification. Similar miscalculations of the rate of growth of African discontent and aspirations also affected the short-term validity of the regional estimates on French West Africa, the French Cameroons, and Uganda. However, the regional estimates in general had a high degree of validity.

2. Two aspects of the estimate were not developed in sufficient detail. While we noted that Western colonial policies in Africa might become a touchstone of relations between the Arab-Asian states and the West, we failed to forecast the role which the Arab-Asian states have rapidly come to play in African affairs. In addition, certain estimates were made concerning the foreign policies which would be pursued by African colonial territories once they had become independent, but we did not call attention to the incentives to irredentism and expansionism which are likely to influence future relations among the African states themselves.

3. With the exceptions noted above, we believe that our estimates were an accurate forecast of trends in the area. Despite the modifications of detail which are inevitable after a lapse of three years, the analysis of political, racial, economic, and social problems remains fundamentally correct. Moreover, although we did not forecast a more active Soviet policy, we did point out the opportunities which the area presented to the USSR.

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IAC-D-100/20  
9 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 65-55:

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Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,

published 1 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 65-55, "Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955," published 1 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 7 August 1956 (IAC-M-251, item 15 c).



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IAC-D-100/20  
9 August 1956

Validity Study of NIE 65-55:

Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,

published 1 March 1955

1. One of the major conclusions of NIE 65-55, "that a government dominated by the Masjumi will probably emerge following the elections" has been proven invalid by events. This conclusion was based on the estimate that the election would be a three-cornered race between the Masjumi, the PNI, and the PKI, and that the Masjumi would win the most seats in the Parliament. We believed it would be able to form a coalition government either with one or more of the smaller parties or by drawing away the right wing of the PNI. In fact, however, the Masjumi received a somewhat smaller popular vote than the PNI and the same number of seats. Moreover, instead of there being but three major parties, the election resulted in four: PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI. In this situation it was the PNI rather than the Masjumi that played the leading role in organizing a cabinet. The major factor in this incorrect estimate of the outcome of the elections was a failure to appreciate the strength of NU, which was able to gain a sufficiently large share of the Moslem votes to reduce Masjumi strength substantially and to become the third largest party.

2. The other major conclusion, that Communist popular strength was increasing and that the Communists would not resort to force during the period of the estimate has proven valid.

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IAC-D-100/19  
27 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55:

Yugoslavia's International Position,

published 7 September 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 31-2-55, "Yugoslavia's International Position," published 7 September 1955, was noted by the IAC on 24 July 1956 (IAC-M-248, item 3 b).



Secretary

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**SECRET**IAC-D-100/19  
27 July 1956Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55:Yugoslavia's International Position,published 7 September 1955

1. This estimate, written from the vantage point of September 1955, was a little too cautious, but was essentially valid as of the time it was written. It placed more stress on Tito's desire to maintain a flexible position between the two major power blocs than we do at present in the light of recent developments. However, it emphasized that the development of Yugoslav-Bloc ties would continue and indicated that this process would probably include "cautious moves toward re-establishment of party-to-party ties." Yugoslavia's actual moves during the intervening period have not materially varied from those predicted in NIE 31-2-55.

2. The principal shortcomings of NIE 31-2-55 were its failure to anticipate how far and fast the Soviet leaders would go along lines likely to reduce Yugoslav suspicions about them and how willing Yugoslavia would be to accept evidence that Soviet policy had indeed changed. Although we expected that the USSR would make continuing efforts to convince the Yugoslavs of its good faith, NIE 31-2-55 did not foresee such developments as the violent denunciation of Stalin and Stalinism in the Bloc. These developments in fields outside the narrow scope of Yugoslav-Soviet relations per se have almost certainly done much to convince Tito and his colleagues that Soviet policy was in fact developing along lines desired by them and that there would no longer be "great personal danger" in closer relations with the USSR. On its side, Yugoslavia has accepted special bonds of friendship and common interest with the USSR without waiting for the development of a "significant" weakening of Kremlin control over the Satellites and the emergence of conditions in which Yugoslavia would have a "real voice in Communist affairs." In short, the Russians have given more and Tito has demanded somewhat less than we foresaw in NIE 31-2-55.

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IAC-D-100/18  
20 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 91-54:

Probable Developments in Argentina:

published 9 March 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 91-54, "Probable Developments in Argentina," published 9 March 1954, was noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July 1956, item 10 c).



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IAC-D-100/18  
20 July 1956

Validity Study of NIE 91-54:

Probable Developments in Argentina,

published 9 March 1954

1. NIE 91-54 did not anticipate the revolution which drove Peron from power in 1955. We did not foresee that Peron would adopt a virulent anti-Church policy such as developed after 1954, or the effects of such a policy on the political scene. It overestimated Peron's ability, through the policy of moderation followed after 1952, to repair army loyalty shaken by the activities of Eva Peron prior to her death in July of that year. NIE 91-54 also failed to give adequate weight to the intentions and political determinations of the Argentine armed forces, especially the navy. At the same time, it underestimated the negative effects of Peron's policy of collaboration with the US on his support and in providing, in connection with petroleum development, an issue with patriotic overtones that lent itself to exploitation by his opponents.

2. The unforeseeable developments with respect to the Church and the inadequacies of analysis indicated above produced the erroneous conclusion that Peron, barring accidents or assassination, would be safe through 1955. It was correctly anticipated that Peron's disappearance would produce a struggle for power and that an army-backed caretaker government would succeed him, but the implication in NIE 91-54 that the navy would play a minor role rather than, as it now does in fact, a determining one, was mistaken. The likelihood of army disunity, which is a necessary condition of the navy's current political significance, and the existence of navy leaders able and willing to assume political power were not sufficiently considered.

3. Conclusion as to the validity of our estimate that any successor government to Peron would probably follow the same general internal and external policies must be reserved pending political stabilization in Argentina.

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IAC-D-100/17  
20 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam

to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

NIE 63.1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam

to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

The attached validity studies of NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956," published 19 July 1955, and NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956," published 11 October 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July, item 9 c).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/17  
20 July 1956

Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam

to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

NIE 63.1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam

to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-55 to the effect that the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam" and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for stability and control."

2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with its own forces to seize Laos.

3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that, "The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality."

4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-3-55 to the effect that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements, make further progress in developing a more effective government, and refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. However, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in NIE 63.1-3-55.

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IAC-D-100/17  
20 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam  
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

NIE 63.1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam  
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

The attached validity studies of NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956," published 19 July 1955, and NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956," published 11 October 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July, item 9 c).



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IAC-D-100/17  
20 July 1956

Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam

to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

NIE 63.1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam

to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-55 to the effect that the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam" and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for stability and control."

2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with its own forces to seize Laos.

3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that, "The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality."

4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-3-55 to the effect that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements, make further progress in developing a more effective government, and refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. However, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in NIE 63.1-3-55.

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IAC-D-100/16  
11 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 22-55:

Probable Developments in France,

published 29 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 22-55, "Probable Developments in France," published 29 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 10 July 1956 (IAC-M-246, 10 July, item 5 c).



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IAC-D-100/16

11 July 1956

Validity Study of NIE 22-55:

Probable Developments in France,

published 29 March 1955

NIE 22-55 proved invalid in these respects:

a. The estimate failed to appreciate the divisive forces among the moderate parties that caused them to split into center-left and center-right alignments in the 1956 elections. This in large measure was responsible for the 50 percent increase in Communist seats in the new Assembly, even though the same electoral law applied in 1956 as in 1951 and the popular vote for the Communists was, as estimated, almost the same as in 1951. (See paras. 2, 25, and 21 with footnote.)

b. The impression given by the estimate was that the Communists would remain in a greater degree of political isolation than has in fact proved to be the case. (Paras. 4, 30)

c. As was also the case in earlier estimates, NIE 22-55 has thus far proved distinctly pessimistic on the prospects for French economic growth. Thus, it was estimated in paragraph 38 that ". . . French economic growth over the next four years is likely to be about equal to that in 1950-1954. . . GNP is likely to rise by almost three percent annually, and industrial production may increase by almost four percent. . . ." Actually, GNP increased in 1955 by 6.3 percent while industrial production increased by 10 percent. Although the 1956 rate of increase is not likely to be as high as the 1955 rate, it will probably substantially exceed the average annual figures given in NIE 22-55.

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IAC-D-100/16

11 July 1956

d. The estimate was overly pessimistic regarding the outlook for French support of further supranational European institutions. (Paras. 62-63)

e. NIE 22-55 overestimated the determination of the French to remain in Tunisia and Morocco and to use force in order to retain privileges. (Para. 66)

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IAC-D-100/15  
27 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 32-55:

The Outlook for Greece,  
published 18 January 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 32-55, "The Outlook for Greece," published 18 January 1955, was noted by the IAC on 26 June 1956 (IAC-M-244, 26 June 1956, item 6 c).



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IAC-D-100/15

27 June 1956

Validity Study of NIE 32-55:

The Outlook for Greece,

published 18 January 1955

1. The judgments contained in NIE 32-55 were generally sound. It correctly assessed the nature and importance of the effect which the death or withdrawal of Prime Minister Papagos would have on the general political situation. It did not estimate that Papagos' successor would be able to reconstitute a conservative grouping along the lines of the Greek Rally and win new elections. In this connection the estimate did not sufficiently take into account the role which the Palace and the army can play in the final outcome of a Greek election. The estimate's judgments on economic and military developments remain generally valid.

2. The only major shortcoming of the estimate was its failure to anticipate how far the Cyprus situation would deteriorate during the estimative period. This was reflected in an incorrect prediction that British influence in Greece would remain substantial and in a failure to foresee the sharp rise in Greek-Turkish tension which has taken place, together with the added internal political instability and the increased strains in Greece's relations with the US and NATO resulting therefrom.

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IAC-D-100/14  
25 June 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54:

Probable Developments in North Africa,

published 31 August 1954

The attached validity study of the Libyan section of NIE 71-54,  
"Probable Developments in North Africa," published 31 August 1954,  
was noted by the IAC on 19 June 1956 (IAC-M-243, 19 June 1956,  
item 10 c).



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IAC-D-100/14  
25 June 1956

Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54:

Probable Developments in North Africa,

published 31 August 1954

1. With minor exceptions, the estimates concerning Libya made in NIE 71-54 appear to have been valid. The fundamental factors noted in NIE 71-54 as affecting internal political stability continue to do so. The analysis of Libyan external relations correctly assessed the prospects for passage of the US-Libyan Base Agreement, further French-Libyan difficulties, the decline of British influence in Libya, and Egypt's challenge to the Western position in the kingdom.

2. NIE 71-54 (paragraph 66) did over-emphasize the extent to which Turkey would successfully compete with Egypt for influence in Libya. The estimate also did not anticipate the establishment of diplomatic relations between Libya and the USSR or recent Soviet gestures toward Libya.

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IAC-D-100/13  
13 June 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 27.1-54:

Probable Developments in Spain,

published 17 May 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 27.1-54, "Probable Developments in Spain," published 17 May 1954, was noted by the IAC on 12 June 1956 (IAC-M-242, 12 June 1956, item 4 c).



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IAC-D-100/13

13 June 1956

Validity Study of NIE 27.1-54:

Probable Developments in Spain,

published 17 May 1954

Over-all developments in Spain during the past two years have not substantially altered the validity of NIE 27.1-54. However, events of the past six months have prompted us to be somewhat more apprehensive concerning political stability, especially for the long range, than we were in NIE 27.1-54.

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IAC-D-100/12  
24 May 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 100-4-55:

Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect  
to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955,  
and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions  
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan,

published 16 March 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 100-4-55, "Communist  
Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and  
Taiwan Through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions  
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan," published 16 March 1955,  
was noted by the IAC on 22 May 1956 (IAC-M-240, 22 May 1956,  
item 7 c).



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IAC-D-100/12  
24 May 1956

Validity Study of NIE 100-4-55:

Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect  
to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955,  
and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions  
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan,

published 16 March 1955

1. We believe that the statements in NIE 100-4-55 concerning Chinese Communist objectives with respect to Taiwan remain valid. Information currently available tends to confirm the estimates of Chinese Communist military strengths and trends in capabilities.

2. Although it was estimated correctly that the Communists would not attack Taiwan, events have not borne out the predictions that "the Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these groups" or that "they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion."

3. The estimate generally under-rated the willingness of the Chinese Communists to proceed cautiously and gradually toward their objectives in the Taiwan Straits. It failed to anticipate the shift in emphasis from military pressure to diplomatic and psychological means which occurred almost coincidentally with publication of the estimate.

4. The sections of the estimate dealing with reactions to certain possible US courses of action have not been tested.

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IAC-D-100/11  
9 May 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 79:

Probable Developments in South Asia,

published 30 June 1953

The attached validity study of NIE 79, "Probable Developments in South Asia," published 30 June 1953, was noted by the IAC on 8 May 1956 (IAC-M-239, 8 May 1956, item 9 c).



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IAC-D-100/11  
9 May 1956

Validity Study of NIE 79:

Probable Developments in South Asia,

published 30 June 1953

1. In general, the sections of NIE 79 dealing with India have held up extremely well. While the estimate has to some extent been outdated by such developments as the launching of the second Five Year Plan and the major shift in Sino-Soviet Bloc tactics which has taken place since it was produced, most of its judgments on India still appear generally sound. NIE 79 specifically anticipated India's resentment of US military aid to Pakistan and the increased tension in the subcontinent which has ensued, and has thus far been borne out in its judgment that these developments would nevertheless not result either in an India-Pakistan war or in an Indian break with the West.

2. Viewed in retrospect, NIE 79 was probably somewhat over-pessimistic in its assessment of the economic outlook, particularly in its heavy emphasis on population pressure. With the aid of two bumper crop years, India has already achieved a rate of economic growth approximately double that of population growth; the principal question now is whether India can achieve the far more ambitious goals set out under the Second Five Year Plan. However, we still agree with NIE 79's basic judgment that even if the First Five Year Plan succeeded, India would still have made only a start at solving the formidable economic problems confronting it. And while the danger of population growth outstripping economic growth has receded for the present it will remain a potential threat until and unless India can achieve a sustained rate of economic expansion considerably higher than the present one.

3. NIE 79's estimate that the Congress Party had an "excellent" chance of winning the 1957 elections is probably too

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IAC-D-100/11  
9 May 1956

categorical in view of the uncertainties about voting behavior revealed in recent elections in such similar countries as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Ceylon. However, NIE 79's assessment of Congress Party strengths and weaknesses still remains generally valid.

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IAC-D-100/10  
17 April 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of:

NIE 23-54, Probable Developments in West Germany,  
published 20 December 1954, and  
NIE 23-55, West Germany and the Reunification Issue,  
published 28 June 1955

The attached validity studies of NIE 23-54, "Probable  
Developments in West Germany," published 20 December 1954,  
and NIE 23-55, "West Germany and the Reunification Issue,"  
published 28 June 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 April 1956  
(IAC-M-237, 17 April 1956, item 6 c ).



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IAC-D-100/10

17 April 1956

Validity Studies of:

NIE 23-54, Probable Developments in West Germany,  
published 20 December 1954, and  
NIE 23-55, West Germany and the Reunification Issue,  
published 28 June 1955

1. NIE 23-54, "Probable Developments in West Germany," was approved by the IAC on 20 December 1954. In general, the estimate remains valid, but on the whole both the pre-1957 and longer-term political outlook for West Germany now appear to be somewhat more uncertain than was estimated in NIE 23-54. This estimate did not anticipate that the BHE and FDP would leave the coalition, and did not foresee the increase of nationalist tendencies. Moreover, the differences estimated in connection with the Saar problem did not materialize.

2. NIE 23-55, "West Germany and the Reunification Issue," was approved by the IAC on 28 June 1955, shortly before the Summit Conference. It was written at the time of some of the early shifts in Soviet policy during the spring of 1955, but before the much more relaxed atmosphere which developed after the Summit Conference. Most of its major points still appear sound. A few others, however, would require correction to correspond to changes in the German atmosphere consequent to the Summit and Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conferences.

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IAC-D-100/9  
10 April 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 74:

Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953,

published 20 February 1953

The attached validity study of NIE 74, "Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953," published 20 February 1953, was noted by the IAC on 10 April 1956 (IAC-M-236, 10 April 1956, item 7 c).



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IAC-D-100/9  
10 April 1956

Validity Study of NIE 74:

Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953,

published 20 February 1953

1. NIE 74 was primarily directed at the internal security problem in Burma. This estimate accurately reflected the improvements in the security situation since the previous estimates and it predicted correctly a slight improvement in prospects for internal security and economic and political stability through the rest of 1953.

2. In stating that ". . . Burma will probably continue to accept /through 1953/ the assistance of the West in strengthening its armed forces and its economy," the estimate failed to anticipate the impact of the Chinese Nationalist troop issue on Burmese foreign affairs. The TCA program was cancelled as of June 30, 1953, primarily because U Nu did not want to be in the position of accepting US aid at the same time that Burma was attacking the US in the UN on the issue of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Burma. However, the TCA projects already started were allowed to be completed and the actual termination date of the TCA aid came well after the end of 1953.

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IAC-D-100/7  
20 March 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:

Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US

and Key Overseas Installations and Forces

Through 1 July 1958,

published 23 June 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through 1 July 1958," published 23 June 1955, was noted by the IAC on 20 March 1956 (IAC-M-234, 20 March 1956, item 5 a).



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IAC-D-100/7  
20 March 1956

Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:  
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US  
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces  
Through 1 July 1958,  
published 23 June 1955

From a strictly intelligence standpoint, we are unable to test the validity of most of the specific estimates made in NIE 11-7-55. On the other hand, such evidence as we have concerning the Soviet long-range bomber and air base development programs tends to confirm the general trends indicated in that estimate, and no important evidence has appeared to invalidate any of its major conclusions. However, new intelligence on such Soviet weapons programs as guided missiles and submarines suggests that the USSR might give greater emphasis to those weapons systems in initial attacks on US and key US overseas installations and forces, even though it would still rely primarily on manned bombers through mid-1958. This new evidence has been taken into account in the preparation of NIE 11-56, and is especially reflected in our estimate of Soviet capabilities for the latter part of the period covered by the new estimate.

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IAC-D-100/6  
28 February 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet Policy

With Respect to Berlin

The attached validity study of the following estimates regarding Soviet policy with respect to Berlin was noted by the IAC on 28 February (IAC-M-232, 28 February 1956, item 4 b): NIE 81, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany Through Mid-1954," 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agreements," 1 March 1955; NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960," 17 May 1955; and NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," 6 December 1955.



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IAC-D-100/6  
28 February 1956

Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet Policy

With Respect to Berlin

1. Estimates regarding Soviet policy with respect to Berlin were made in: NIE 81, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany Through Mid-1954," 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agreements," 1 March 1955; NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960," 17 May 1955; and NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," 6 December 1955.
2. The statements concerning Berlin in these papers appeared in different estimative contexts and are consequently not exactly comparable. The first three estimates cited above considered Soviet policy in Berlin in the context of the anticipated Soviet response to West German rearmament. The latter estimate was made after West German rearmament had already begun, and after the attendant readjustment in Soviet policy had already become apparent in its main outlines.
3. We believe that all of those estimates were correct in their principal conclusion--that the USSR would be restrained in its actions in Berlin by fear of precipitating general war, and that it would not carry its pressure against the Western position to the point of provoking a major crisis. At the same time, we believe that the first three estimates were so expressed as to permit the inference that the immediate Soviet reaction to West German rearmament might include more severe pressures against Berlin than we now believe likely.

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IAC-D-100/5  
7 February 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of SE-48:

Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the  
Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea,  
published 13 October 1953

The attached validity study of SE-48, "Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea," published 13 October 1953, was noted by the IAC on 7 February (IAC-M-229, 7 February 1956, item 4 c).



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IAC-D-100/5  
7 February 1956

Validity Study of SE-48:

Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the  
Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea,  
published 13 October 1953

The last general estimate on the Republic of Korea was published in 1948. Since that time there have been numerous estimates dealing with the Korean War situation, with particular emphasis on Communist capabilities and intentions. The last estimate dealing with the ROK was SE-48, "Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea," dated 13 October 1953. This estimate was concerned primarily with Rhee's capabilities and intentions unilaterally to initiate military action in Korea and its principal conclusions were as follows:

"The ROK has the capability, despite UNC surveillance and countermeasures, to initiate courses of armed action which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities. We believe that despite some opposition there are enough ROK political and military leaders who would obey any orders President Rhee might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military action."

"We believe that President Rhee will continue to threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen his general bargaining position with regard to international discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover, the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate military action against the Communists at any time."

Although the first quoted conclusions has not been subjected to a test, we believe it remains valid. Rhee has continued to threaten renewal of hostilities and we continue to believe that the possibility exists that he might initiate military action at any time.

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IAC-D-100/4  
7 February 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Validity Study of NIE 24-54:

Probable Developments in Italy,

published 16 November 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 24-54, "Probable Developments in Italy," published 16 November 1954, was noted by the IAC on 7 February (IAC-M-229, 7 February 1956, item 5 c).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/4  
7 February 1956

Validity Study of NIE 24-54:

Probable Developments in Italy,

published 16 November 1954

1. NIE 24-54 estimated developments in Italy through 1958. Hence the validity of its judgments cannot now be fully determined. In general, its principal conclusions appear to be still sound.
2. In particular, the social and economic weaknesses noted in NIE 24-54 as basic to the Italian situation persist, and no substantial mitigation of these conditions is in sight. Developments since the publication of NIE 24-54 have tended to substantiate many of its other significant estimates, e. g.: (a) the Communists would be unlikely to come to power either electorally or by force, although the basic electoral appeal of the Communists would remain great; (b) the Scelba government would probably be replaced by mid-1955; (c) indications pointed toward a moderate leftward swing in Italian domestic policy; (d) the Italian government would attempt to implement economic and social reforms but obstacles to implementation of far-reaching programs, including divisions within the center coalition, would remain formidable; and (e) the Christian-Democrats would improve their organization and probably make some net electoral gains, while rightist parties would suffer a further recession in popularity.
3. Nevertheless, NIE 24-54 though recognizing difficulties within the coalition did not anticipate the extent to which these and other developments would increase the chances of political cooperation between the center parties and the Nenni Socialists.

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IAC-D-100/3  
10 January 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 12-54:

Probable Developments in the European Satellites

Through Mid-1956,

published 24 August 1954

The attached validity study of NIE 12-54, "Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956," published 24 August 1954, was approved by the IAC on 10 January (IAC-M-225, 10 January 1956, Secretary's Note 3).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-100/3  
10 January 1956

Validity Study of NIE 12-54:

Probable Developments in the European Satellites

Through Mid-1956,

published 24 August 1954

1. NIE 12-54 appears to have been in general an adequate statement of the aims of the Soviet Union in the Satellite area and of the probable courses of action of the Satellite regimes. With the lapse of one year, however, certain modifications of 12-54 appear to be indicated.
2. In its political sections, NIE 12-54 lays great emphasis on the firmness of Soviet control and the character of the control system. While this emphasis was justified, there was little discussion of the problems which confronted Soviet policy makers in their efforts to maximize the value of the Satellites to the USSR, nor any appreciation of alternative approaches to these problems which Soviet leaders might consider. The over-all effect of 12-54 is to imply inflexibility on the part of the Soviets at a time when in fact the implementation of their policy was undergoing modification.
3. The estimates for the growth of GNP and for nonagriculture production for the years 1954-1956 appear to have been somewhat low. In the case of East Germany, however, the projected rate of economic growth appears to have been high. Whereas we had estimated that by 1956 East Germany would replace Poland as the leading contributor to Satellite GNP, we no longer believe this to be the case. We now think that this will not take place even by 1960. The estimate did not take sufficient account of the extent and concreteness of projects for increased regional coordination of planning to begin in 1956.
4. In the military field, NIE 12-54 overestimated personnel strength increases of Satellite ground forces and underestimated the combat effectiveness of ground and air forces,

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IAC-D-100/3  
10 January 1956

including their political reliability. NIE 12-54 estimated augmentation of Satellite ground forces of 150,000 men by mid-1955. It is now believed that ground forces will increase in strength by only 115,000 by 1960. We believe this will occur despite Satellite announcements of proposed strength reductions. As to reliability, in NIE 12-54 we estimated the Satellite armed forces through 1956 would remain questionable enough to place a significant limitation on their usefulness in the event of general war. On reconsideration, we now believe that their combat effectiveness, including reliability, and especially that of ground forces, was substantially greater than estimated.

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IAC-D-100/2  
10 January 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 64-55:

Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo,

published 24 May 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 64-55, "Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo, published 24 May 1955, has been approved by the Board of National Estimates and the IAC representatives. It will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 17 January 1956, for noting.



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/2  
10 January 1956

Validity Study of NIE 64-55:

Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo,

published 24 May 1955

1. Many conclusions of NIE 64-55, "Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo" still appear to be sound, particularly those dealing with the effects of external contingencies and the determination of the UK to prevent local groups under Communist control from seizing power. The paper also estimated correctly that the Communists would follow a policy of subordinating guerrilla warfare to political penetration and subversion. However, because of its focus on the military aspects of the Communist problem, the discussion did not highlight a number of the more general racial and nationalist problems in the area.

2. NIE 64-55 foresaw an Alliance victory in the Federation's first legislative elections, but did not predict so sweeping a victory as actually developed. Accordingly, the discussion underplayed the potential of the native non-Communist movements, and did not indicate clearly that the native government would acquire a fairly strong position for negotiation with the British and that the pace of British concessions to a local government might exceed the "succession of small advances toward autonomy" (Para. 29) which the estimate projected. In particular, the recent British willingness to modify their position that an end to the state of emergency is a precondition for further steps toward self-government would seem to be at variance with the spirit if not the letter of the estimate that: "the British authorities almost certainly will continue to advertise and demonstrate their intention to retain ultimate power in Malaya--while gradually turning over civil responsibilities to the local leaders--until the Communist threat has been extinguished." (Para. 34)

3. The section on Singapore appears to have substantially underestimated the rate of growth in Communist influence that has taken place in the last six months. In particular, the mushrooming

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IAC-D-100/2  
10 January 1956

of Communist-influenced trade unions was not foreseen. The substantial Communist influence exerted within the key PAP-controlled unions has already largely invalidated the estimate that Communists will be prevented "from gaining full control of important mass organizations except for Chinese student groups." (Para. 47) The expansion of Communist strength and capabilities has been great during the past half year, and was not accurately charted by a basic estimate that "some expansion. . . appears likely." (Para. 47)

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IAC-D-100/1

8 December 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 70:

Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security,

published 12 December 1952

The attached validity study of NIE 70, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security," published 12 December 1952, was noted by the IAC on 6 December (IAC-M-221, 6 December 1955, Item 4 c).



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IAC-D-100/1

8 December 1955

Validity Study of NIE 70:Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security,published 12 December 1952

1. The basic social, economic, and military conditions in Latin America continue to be those described in NIE 70. Current developments confirm the characterization of Latin America in NIE 70 as an area experiencing accelerated social change accompanied by rapid, but unbalanced, economic development, and consequently a region of political instability.

2. The key political estimate in NIE 70, a continuing trend toward radical nationalistic regimes, has not been borne out by current developments. Instead, the present tendency is toward a more moderate political orientation in Latin America. However, the basic conditions which underlay the political estimate in NIE 70 are still present and potentially effective.

3. The reversal of the trend toward radical nationalistic regimes and the increased willingness of Latin America to cooperate with the United States were caused by external as well as internal factors. In some cases the United States exerted a positive influence to reverse the trend toward extremism identified in NIE 70 and other intelligence estimates. In Bolivia and Guatemala, for example, contributions were made to the emergence and preservation of moderate, anti-Communist leadership. Among other external factors the end of the Korean War reduced Latin American fears of involvement and encouraged a greater willingness to cooperate with the United States. Internal factors centered in the failure of radical and demagogic Latin American regimes to satisfy the demand for more rapid material progress. In Argentina and Brazil such regimes intensified social cleavages which provoked reactions by military elements.

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IAC-D-100

8 December 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of National Estimates

1. On 26 April 1955 the IAC adopted a procedure for two kinds of review subsequent to the completion of NIE's: an immediate post-mortem on each estimate, and validity studies after the lapse of an appropriate interval to determine how good the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments (IAC-M-194, 26 April 1955, Item 3).

2. In accordance with this decision, validity studies have recently been undertaken on those estimates agreed by the Board of National Estimates and the IAC representatives to be suitable for such an analysis. The attached validity study of NIE 71-54, "Probable Developments in North Africa," published 31 August 1954, was noted by the IAC on 6 December (IAC-M-221, 6 December 1955, Item 3 c).



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8 December 1955

Validity Study of NIE 71-54:

Probable Developments in North Africa,

published 31 August 1954

1. NIE 71-54 for the most part remains a basically valid estimate. Various paragraphs dealing with the current situation and short-term developments are out-dated in many respects, but to no greater degree than would normally be anticipated as a result of the passage of time. Most of the longer-range estimates cannot be tested at this early date, but so far they appear to be generally accurate.
2. Current developments are tending to confirm the key estimates in NIE 71-54 that: (a) there would be a continued growth in nationalist activity in all three North African areas; and (b) France would probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first in Tunisia and later in Morocco, but would not fully satisfy increasing nationalist demands. As stated in the NIE, France has sought to avoid concessions which would endanger its strategic control or would destroy the privileged position of the settlers of French descent.
3. However, NIE 71-54 failed to reflect adequately in terms of timing two significant developments over the past year: the early outbreak of nationalist violence in Algeria, and the sharp acceleration of such violence in Morocco. The short-term effect on Algeria of events in Tunisia and Morocco was not given sufficient emphasis in the NIE. Moreover, lacking intelligence on the development of the CRUA, a revolutionary faction within the extremist wing of Algerian nationalism, we did not anticipate violence on the scale of the November 1954 uprising in northeast Algeria. With regard to terrorism in French Morocco, NIE 71-54 did not indicate sufficiently clearly the likely short-term effect of nationalist pressure on the French.

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IAC-D-100

8 December 1955

4. With respect to Libya, much of the background discussion is still basically valid, although various details have become outdated. NIE 71-54 correctly estimated such short-term developments as successful conclusion of the US base agreement and increased friction between France and Libya over the Fezzan. The longer-range estimates might be worded somewhat differently if written now, but we believe they remain generally accurate.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 7, 1978

TO: INR/DDR - Ms. LaBrie

FROM: PA/HO - Paul Claussen *u/c*

SUBJECT: Request for Documents

Several members of our staff would like to review the following documents:

IAC-D-50/4	National Intelligence Objectives	10 Jan. 1955
IAC-D-57/18	Post-Mortem on NIE 36.1-55	15 Nov. 1955
IAC-D-57/19	Post-Mortem on SNIE 30-3-55	29 Nov. 1955
IAC-D-57/21	Post-Mortem on NIE 30-4-55	20 Dec. 1955
IAC-D-98	Glossary of Intelligence Terms	22 Aug. 1955
IAC-D-98/1	Glossary of Intelligence Terms	12 Sept. 1955
IAC-D-55/10.2	NSC Status Report on Foreign Intelligence Programs	16 July 1956
IAC-D-55/11	Memo for IAC and Chairman IAC Subcommittee	22 June 1956
IAC-D-100/8	Validity Study of NIE 76	20 March 1956
IAC-D-64	Index to IAC documents issued in 1952	Jan. 1953
IAC-D-64/1	" " " " " " 1953	Jan. 1954
IAC-D-64/2	" " " " " " 1954	Jan. 1955

My extension has been changed once again; it is now 28517. Could you call me or Ms. Lynn Fliakas (ext. 29477) when any documents are available for pickup.

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TS #141679/d

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IAC-D-100/54

26 December 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE


Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in NIE 11-5-57:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in

the Guided Missile Field,

published 12 March 1957

The attached validity study of the ICBM estimate made in NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," published 12 March 1957, was noted by the IAC on 17 December 1957 (IAC-M-321, item 8 c).



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TS #141679/d  
IAC-D-100/54  
26 December 1957

Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in NIE 11-5-57:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in

the Guided Missile Field,

published 12 March 1957

The estimate in NIE 11-5-57 was made in the absence of evidence which could be associated directly with Soviet development of an ICBM. Since its publication in March 1957, some evidence relating to Soviet ICBM development has been acquired. In the light of this new evidence, we believe that NIE 11-5-57 correctly estimated that the USSR attached a high priority to acquisition of an ICBM capability, and that it possessed or was rapidly acquiring the necessary data for solution of ICBM development problems. The new evidence indicates, however, that we underestimated the scale of effort and the rapidity with which the USSR was solving its problems. On the basis of this evidence, we have now advanced the estimated date of first operational capability from 1960-1961 (as estimated in NIE 11-5-57) to sometime in the period mid-1958 to mid-1959.

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IAC-D-100/43  
5 August 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Study of NIE 21-55:

Probable Developments in the United Kingdom,

published 8 February 1955

The attached validity study of NIE 21-55, "Probable Developments in the United Kingdom," published 8 February 1955, was noted by the IAC on 30 July 1957 (IAC-M-300, item 7 c).



Secretary

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IAC-D-100/43  
5 August 1957

Validity Study of NIE 21-55:

Probable Developments in the United Kingdom,  
published 8 February 1955

NIE 21-55 has proven correct in most of its judgments. It pointed out, among other things, that fairly substantial changes would be made in the military establishment. We correctly foresaw some of the changes which have been made, although we did not predict the extent to which the UK would revamp its concepts regarding defense against nuclear attack and would shift to the nuclear deterrent concept. We also failed to foresee the extent to which US-UK differences would develop over the Middle East.

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TS #141565  
IAC-D-100/32  
21 March 1957  
Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_ 85

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**Validity Study of  
NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs  
in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954,  
and its Supplement,  
NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and  
Probable Programs, 20 December 1955**

The attached validity study of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet  
Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field,"  
published 5 October 1954, and its Supplement, NIE 11-12-55,  
"Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs,"  
published 20 December 1955, was noted by the IAC on 19 March  
1957 (IAC-M-281, item 3 b).



**Secretary**

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TS #141565  
IAC-D-100/32  
21 March 1957

Validity Study of  
NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs  
in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954,  
and its Supplement,  
NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and  
Probable Programs, 20 December 1955

1. Firm evidence is still extremely meager except in isolated cases, and our present estimate suffers many of the same limitations as did NIE 11-6-54. The fact that good correlation exists between certain findings in the present estimate and its predecessors is not a sound basis for establishing the validity of NIE 11-6-54. However, in this new and complex field, where positive intelligence is still minimal, the findings in NIE 11-6-54 are considered to have been basically sound with respect to concept, scientific and technical capability, and general trends of the Soviet guided missile program.

2. The importance of this field of intelligence warrants a more extensive presentation than usual of our examination for validity of those types of missile systems for which new intelligence has become available:

a. Surface-to-Air

(1) NIE 11-6-54 estimated that a 10-12 nautical mile system could be operational in 1954, which could carry a 600 pound warhead to an altitude of 50,000 feet. This system could be improved in 1955 to engage targets at 15-17 nautical miles, and by 1958 could have a maximum range of 25 nautical miles at 60,000 feet altitude.

(2) NIE 11-12-55 did not change the above, but stated additionally that this system was being installed around Moscow and had been at least partially operational since 1955, predicting that all launching sites would be operational by the end of 1956.

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21 March 1957

(3) NIE 11-5-57 has not changed these estimates, except to estimate that the 25 nautical mile range at 60,000 feet altitude has now been reached--one year earlier than predicted in NIE 11-6-54. An estimate is also made that all the sites around Moscow are probably now operational.

(4) In this missile type, NIE 11-6-54, as supplemented, is considered to have been generally valid.

(b) Air-to-Surface

(1) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement both estimated that the USSR could have a subsonic missile of 50 nautical mile range for primary use against ship targets operational in 1956-1957.

(2) NIE 11-5-57 cites evidence that a missile of this type has reached at least final flight test stage.

(3) In this missile type, NIE 11-6-54 is considered to have been generally valid.

(c) Surface-to-Surface (Submarine Launched)

(1) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement estimated that the USSR could have a subsonic, cruise-type missile of 500 nautical miles maximum range for use with a submarine in 1955. Several guidance systems were estimated as possible and the accuracies would vary with the guidance system used.

(2) NIE 11-5-57 did not change the above estimate.

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21 March 1957

(3) The amount of evidence obtained has been meager. It tends to strengthen the previous estimates, but does not permit an evaluation of their validity.

d. Surface-to-Surface (Ballistic)

(1) NIE 11-6-54 estimated that the USSR could have in 1954 missile systems of this type operational to ranges of 350 and 500 nautical miles. Shorter range missiles of unspecified ranges were also estimated. A missile of 900 nautical miles range with a 3000 pound payload was estimated for first operational use in 1957, or, at the earliest possible date, in 1955.

(2) NIE 11-12-55 estimated that the USSR was not developing a 500 nautical mile ballistic missile. It also changed the estimated range of the 900 nautical mile missile to 850-900 nautical miles and its first operational date to 1955-1956.

(3) On the basis of new intelligence, NIE 11-5-57 reiterates the previous estimate on the 350 nautical mile missile except that the missile accuracy is believed better. Shorter range missiles are now specified as 75 nautical miles and 175-200 nautical miles. New intelligence leads us to believe that the previously estimated 850-900 n. m. missile now has a maximum range of 700 n. m., and refinements in our calculations indicate that this missile carries a 6,000 pound payload.

(4) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement are considered to have been generally valid regarding Soviet capabilities to develop these missile types, but they incorrectly estimated that the USSR intended to maximize its range capabilities in the 500-900 nautical mile range band.

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